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Abstract
We introduce the oak property of first order theories, which is a syntactical condition that we
show to be sufficient for a theory not to have universal models in cardinality λ when certain cardinal
arithmetic assumptions about λ implying the failure of GCH (and close to the failure of SCH) hold.
We give two examples of theories that have the oak property and show that none of these examples
satisfy SOP4, not even SOP3. This is related to the question of the connection of the property SOP4
to non-universality, as was raised by the earlier work of Shelah. One of our examples is the theory
T ∗feq for which non-universality results similar to the ones we obtain are already known; hence we
may view our results as an abstraction of the known results from a concrete theory to a class of
theories.
We show that no theory with the oak property is simple.
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0. Introduction
Since the very early days of the mathematics of the infinite, the existence of a universal
object in a category has been the object of continued interest to specialists in various
disciplines of mathematics—even Cantor’s work on the uniqueness of the rational numbers
as the countable dense linear order with no endpoints is a result of this type. For some more
recent examples see for instance [1,5]. We approach this problem from the point of view
of model theory, more specifically, classification theory, and we concentrate on first order
theories. In [10] the idea was to consider properties that can serve as good dividing lines
between first order theories (in [10]; more general theories in other work). This is to be
taken in the sense that useful information can be obtained both from the assumption that
a theory satisfies the property, and the assumption that it does not, and in general we may
expect several equivalent definitions for such properties. Preferably, there is an “outside
property” and a “syntactical property” which end up being equivalent. The special outside
property which was central in [10] was the number of pairwise non-isomorphic models, and
it led to considering the notions of stability and superstability. It is natural to ask whether
other divisions can be obtained using problems of similar nature. This is a matter of much
investigation and some other properties have been looked at; see for example [6,18] and
more generally [17]. One such property is universality, which is the main topic of this paper.
In a series of papers, e.g. Kojman–Shelah [8] (see there also for earlier references), [9],
Kojman [7], Shelah [14,16], Džamonja–Shelah [3], the thesis claiming the connection
between the complexity of a theory and its amenability to the existence of universal models
has been pursued. Further research on the subject is in preparation in Shelah’s [20]. It
follows from the classical results in model theory (see [2]) that if GCH holds then every
countable first order theory admits a universal model in every uncountable cardinal, so the
question we need to ask is what happens when GCH fails. We may define the universality
number of a theory T at a given cardinal λ as the smallest size of the family of models of
T of size λ having the property that every model of T of size λ embeds into an element of
the family. Hence, if GCH holds this number for uncountable λ and countable T is always
at most 1. It is usually “easy” to force a situation in which such a universality number is
as large as possible, namely 2λ (by adding Cohen subsets, see [8]); however assuming that
GCH fails and allowing ourselves a vague use of the words “many” and “often” for the mo-
ment, we can distinguish between those theories which for many cardinals have the largest
possible universality number in that cardinal whenever GCH fails, and those for which it is
possible to construct a model of set theory in which GCH fails, yet our theory has a small
universality number at the cardinality under consideration. This division would suggest
that the latter theories—let us call them for the sake of this introduction amenable—are of
lower complexity than the former ones. The definition of amenability can be given in more
precise terms. In the view of the preceding discussion involving the universality behaviour
in models of GCH, it is not surprising that this definition is expressed in terms of forcing.
Definition 0.1. We say that a theory T is amenable iff whenever λ is an uncountable
cardinal larger than the size of T and satisfying λ<λ = λ and 2λ = λ+, while θ satisfies
cf(θ) > λ+, there is a λ+-cc (< λ)-closed forcing notion that forces 2λ to be θ and the
universality number univ(T, λ+) (see Definition 0.7) to be smaller than θ .
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Localising this definition at a particular λ we define what is meant by theories that are
amenable at λ.
Kojman and Shelah in [8] proved that the theory of a dense linear order exhibits high
non-universality behaviour, making it a prototypical example of a non-amenable theory.
That is, they proved (Section 3, proof of Theorem 3.10) that the theory of a dense linear
order satisfies the property described in Definition 0.3, which we shall call high non-
amenability. We shall indicate below that this name is well chosen, in the sense that high
non-amenability implies the negation of amenability as introduced above. In order to define
high non-amenability we shall need a somewhat technical definition of a tight (κ, µ, λ)
club guessing sequence, but as this definition will be needed anyway in Section 2, we shall
give the exact definition now rather than glancing over it for the sake of the introduction.
Definition 0.2. (1) Suppose that κ < λ are regular cardinals and that κ ≤ µ < λ while S
is a stationary subset of λ consisting of points of cofinality κ . A sequence 〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉
will be called a tight [truly tight] (κ, µ, λ) club guessing sequence iff
(i) for every δ ∈ S the set Cδ is a subset of δ with otp(Cδ) = µ,
(ii) for every club E of λ there is δ ∈ S such that Cδ ⊆ E , and
(iii) for every α ∈ λ
|{Cδ ∩ α : δ ∈ S & α ∈ (Cδ \ lim(Cδ))}| < λ.
[In addition to (i)–(iii) above,
(iv) sup(Cδ) = δ.]
(2) Suppose that λ is a regular cardinal, µ < λ and 〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉 satisfies (i)–(iii) from (1)
with the possible exception of S not necessarily being a set of points of cofinality κ for any
fixed κ . Then we say that 〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉 is a tight (µ, λ) club guessing sequence.
Definition 0.3. A theory T is said to be highly non-amenable iff for every large enough
regular cardinal λ and κ < λ such that there is a truly tight (κ, κ, λ) club guessing sequence
〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉, the number univ(T, λ) is at least 2κ .
Suppose that a theory T is both amenable and highly non-amenable, and let λ be a
large enough regular cardinal while V = L or simply λ<λ = λ and ♦(Sλ+λ ) holds. Let
P be the forcing exemplifying that T is amenable. Clearly there is a truly tight (λ, λ, λ+)
club guessing sequence C¯ in V , and since the forcing P is λ+-cc, every club of λ+ in V P
contains a club of λ+ in V ; hence C¯ continues to be a truly tight (λ, λ, λ+) club guessing
sequence in V P . Then on the one hand we have that in V P , univ(T, λ+) ≥ 2λ by the high
non-amenability, while univ(T, λ+) < 2λ by the choice of P , a contradiction.
In fact [8] proves that any theory with the strict order property is highly non-amenable.
On the other hand Shelah proved in [16] that all simple theories are amenable at all succes-
sors of regular κ satisfying κ<κ = κ . In that same paper Shelah introduced a hierarchy of
complexity for first order theories, and showed that high non-amenability appears as soon
as a certain level on that hierarchy is passed. The details of this hierarchy are described
in the following Definition 0.8, but for the moment let us just mention the fact that the
hierarchy describes a sequence SOPn (3 ≤ n < ω) of properties of increasing strength
such that the theory of a dense linear order possesses all the properties, while on the other
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hand no simple theory can have the weakest among them, SOP3. Shelah proved in [16]
that the property SOP4 of a theory T implies that T exhibits the same non-universality
results as the theory of a dense linear order; in other words it is highly non-amenable. In
the light of these results it might then be asked whether SOP4 is a characterisation of high
non-amenability, that is whether all highly non-amenable theories also have SOP4.
The results available in the literature do not provide a counter-example, and the ques-
tion in fact remains open after this investigation. However we provide a partial solution
by continuing a result of Shelah about the theory T ∗feq of infinitely many indexed inde-
pendent equivalence relations, [14]. It is proved there that this particular theory exhibits
a non-amenability behaviour provided that some cardinal arithmetic assumptions close to
the failure of the singular cardinal hypothesis SCH are satisfied (see Section 1 for details).
This does not necessarily imply high non-amenability, as it was proved also in [14] that this
theory is in fact amenable at any cardinal which is the successor of a cardinal κ satisfying
κ<κ = κ . Here we generalise the first of these two results by defining a property which im-
plies such non-amenability results and is possessed by T ∗feq. This property is called the oak
property, as its prototype is the model completion of Th(Mλ,κ, f,g), a theory connected to
that of the tree κ≥λ (for details see Example 1.3). The oak property cannot be made a part of
the SOPn hierarchy, as we exhibit a theory which has oak, and is NSOP3, while the model
completion of the theory of triangle-free graphs is an example of a SOP3 theory which does
not satisfy the oak property. On the other hand we prove at the end of Section 1 that no oak
theory is simple. We also exhibit a close connection between T ∗feq and Th(Mλ,κ, f,g). These
results indicate that in order to make the connection between the high non-amenability,
amenability and the SOPn hierarchy more exact one needs to consider the failure of SCH as
a separate case. In addition the oak property not being compatible with the SOPn hierarchy
gives new evidence that this hierarchy does not exhaust the class of unstable theories that
do not have the strict order property. Note that in [16], 2.3(2) there is an example of a first
order theory that satisfies the strong order property but not the strict order property (and
the strong order property implies all SOPn , though it is not implied by their conjunction).
To finish this introduction, let us summarise the connection between the cardinal arith-
metic and the universality number that is shown in this paper (a more detailed discussion of
this can be found at the end of Section 2). Firstly, by classical model theory, if GCH holds
then the universality number of any first order theory of size < λ, at any cardinal ≥ λ, is
1—hence the situation is trivialised. Similarly, the results that we have here on sufficient
conditions for non-amenability trivialise if the Strong Hypothesis StH of Shelah holds [13]
because the conditions are never satisfied. StH says that pp(µ) = µ+ for every singular µ;
hence cf([µ]<κ,⊆) ≤ µ+ for every κ < µ, so StH implies the Singular Cardinal Hypoth-
esis SCH (it is itself implied by ¬0). However, if StH fails, say κ, λ regulars satisfy that
for some singular µ we have cf(µ) = κ and µ+ < λ while pp(µ) > λ, for all we know
the results here hold and are not trivial, in the sense that not only do all known consistency
proofs of the failure of StH show this, but it is not known whether it is consistent to have
the failure of StH and at the same relevant cardinals a failure of our assumptions.
Let us now commence the mathematical part of the paper by giving some background
notions which will be used in the main sections of the paper, starting with some classical
definitions of model theory.
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Convention 0.4. A theory in this paper means a first order complete theory, unless
otherwise stated. Such an object is usually denoted by T .
Notation 0.5. (1) Given a theory T , we let C = CT stand for “the monster model”, i.e. a
saturated enough model of T . As is usual, we assume without loss of generality that all our
discussion takes place inside some such model, so all expressions to the extent “there is”,
“exists” and “|=” are to be relativised to this model, all models are ≺ C, and all subsets of
C that we mention have size less than the saturation number of C. We let κ¯ = κ¯(CT ) be the
size of C, so this cardinal is larger than any other cardinal mentioned in connection with T .
(2) For a formula ϕ(x¯; a¯) we let ϕ(C; a¯) be the set of all tuples b¯ such that ϕ[b¯; a¯] holds
in C.
Definition 0.6. (1) The tuple b¯ is defined by ϕ(x¯; a¯) if ϕ(C; a¯) = {b¯}. It is defined by the
type p if b¯ is the unique tuple which realises p. It is definable over A if tp(b¯, A) defines it.
(2) The formula ϕ(x¯; a¯) is algebraic if ϕ(C; a¯) is finite. The type p is algebraic if it is
realised by finitely many tuples only. The tuple b¯ is algebraic over A if tp(b¯, A) is.
(3) The definable closure of A is
dcl(A) def= {b : b is definable over A}.
(4) The algebraic closure of A is
acl(A) def= {b : b is algebraic over A}.
(5) If A = acl(A), we say that A is algebraically closed. When dcl(A) and acl(A)
coincide, cl(A) denotes their common value.
Definition 0.7. (1) For a theory T and a cardinal λ, models {Mi : i < i∗} of T , each of
size λ, are jointly universal iff for every N a model of T of size λ there is an i < i∗ and an
isomorphic embedding of N into Mi .
(2) For T and λ as above,
univ(T, λ) def= min{|M| : M is a family of jointly
universal models of T of size λ}.
To make Definition 0.7 more readable, note that univ(T, λ) = 1 iff there is a universal
model of T of size λ. The following is the main definition of Shelah’s [16].
Definition 0.8 (Shelah, [16]). Let n ≥ 3 be a natural number.
(1) A formula ϕ(x¯, y¯) is said to exemplify the n-strong order property, SOPn if lg(x¯) =
lg(y¯), and there are a¯k for k < ω, each of length lg(x¯) such that
(a) |= ϕ[a¯k, a¯m] for k < m < ω,
(b) |= ¬(∃x¯0, . . . , x¯n−1)[∧{ϕ(x¯	, x¯k) : 	, k < n and k = 	 + 1 mod n}].
T has SOPn if there is a formula ϕ(x¯, y¯) exemplifying this.
(2) A theory that does not possess SOPn is said to have NSOPn .
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Note 0.9. Using a compactness argument and the Ramsey theorem, one can prove that if
T is a theory with SOPn and ϕ(x¯, y¯), and 〈a¯n : n < ω〉 exemplify it, without loss of
generality 〈a¯n : n < ω〉 is an indiscernible sequence. See [10] or [6] for examples of such
arguments.
Example 0.10. The model completion of the theory of triangle-free graphs is a
prototypical example of a SOP3 theory, with the formula ϕ(x, y) just stating that x and
y are connected. It can be shown that this theory is NSOP4; see [16].
The following fact indicates that SOPn(3 ≤ n < ω) form a hierarchy, and the thesis is
that this hierarchy is reflected in the complexity of the behaviour of the relevant theories
under natural constructions in model theory.
Fact 0.11 (Shelah, [16], Section 2). For 3 ≤ n < ω the property SOPn+1 of a theory
implies the property SOPn .
1. The oak property
In this section we define a theory T ∗ that will serve as a prototype of a theory that
possesses the oak property. Then we introduce the oak property and prove that the theory
T ∗ has this property. We are interested in the connection between the oak property and
the SOP hierarchy (see Definition 0.8). To this end we shall show that T ∗ satisfies NSOP3
(so by Fact 0.11 it clearly does not satisfy SOP4). As another example we shall show that
the model completion of the theory of infinitely many indexed independent equivalence
relations, T ∗feq, also satisfies oak and NSOP3. This theory is known not to be simple [16],
but we shall in fact show that no theory with the oak property is simple.
We commence with some auxiliary theories which will allow us to define T ∗ (as the
model completion of T +0 ).
Definition 1.1. (1) Let T0 be the following theory in the language
{Q0, Q1, Q2, F0, F1, F2, F3} :
(i) Q0, Q1, Q2 are unary predicates which form a partition of the universe,
(ii) F0 is a partial function from Q1 to Q0,
(iii) F1 is a partial two-place function from Q0 × Q2 to Q1,
(iv) F2 is a partial function from Q0 to Q2,
(v) F3 is a partial function from Q2 to Q0,
(vi) the range of F1 is included in the domain of F0 and for all (x, z) ∈ Dom(F1) we have
F0(F1(x, z)) = x , and
(vii) the range of F2 is included in the domain of F3 and F3(F2(x)) = x for all
x ∈ Dom(F2).
(2) Let T +0 be defined like T0, but with the requirement that F0, F1, F2 and F3 are total
functions.
Remark 1.2. It is to be noted that the above definition of T0 uses partial rather than the
more usual full function symbols. Using partial functions we have to be careful when we
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speak about submodels, where we have a choice of deciding whether statements of the
form “Fl(x) is undefined” are preserved in the larger model. We choose to request that
the fact that Fl is undefined at a certain entry is not necessarily preserved in the larger
model. Functions F2 and F3 are “dummies” whose sole purpose is to ensure that models of
T +0 are non-trivial, while keeping T
+
0 a universal theory (which is useful when discussing
the model completion). Also note that neither T0 nor T +0 is complete, but every model
M of T0 in which QM0 , QM2 = ∅ and F0 and F3 are onto can be extended to a model
of T +0 with the same universe (Claim 1.4(2)), and every model of T0 is a submodel of
a model of T +0 (Claim 1.4(4)). T +0 has a complete model completion (Claim 1.5). This
model completion is the main theory we shall work with and, as we shall show, it has the
oak property (Claim 1.11) and is NSOP4 (Claim 1.7).
As we are only interested in the model completion T ∗ of T +0 we might have omitted the
mention of T0 altogether, but in the interest of possible future examples and also in order
to make the proof of the existence of T ∗ easier, through Claim 1.4 we defined both T0 and
T +0 and then showed how to pass from models of one to models of the other.
Example 1.3. Suppose that κ and λ are infinite cardinals and f is any surjective function
from κλ to κ , while g is a function from κ to κλ satisfying g( f (ν)) = ν for all ν ∈ κλ.
Then we can construct a model M = Mκ,λ, f,g as follows: let QM0 be κ , QM1 be κ>λ, and
QM2 = κλ. Further let F M0 (η) be the length of η for η ∈ Q1, and let F M1 (α, ν) = ν  α.
Let F M3 be f and let F M2 be g.
We consider such examples to be prototypical for models of T +0 .
Claim 1.4. (1) If M is a model of T +0 , then QM0 , QM1 and QM2 are all non-empty, and F M0
and F M3 are onto.
(2) Every model M of T0 in which QM0 = ∅ and QM2 = ∅, while F M0 and F M3 are onto,
can be extended to a model of T +0 with the same universe (and every model of T +0 is a
model of T0).
(3) There are models M of T0 with QM0 = ∅ and QM2 = ∅ and F M3 onto which cannot be
extended to a model of T +0 with the same universe.
(4) Every model of T0 is a submodel of a model of T +0 .
(5) T +0 has the amalgamation property and the joint embedding property JEP.
(6) If M |= T0 and A ⊆ M is finite, then the closure B of A under F M0 , F M1 , F M2 and F M3
is finite (in fact |B| ≤ |A|2 + 2|A|); moreover:
(a) B ∩ QM2 = (A ∩ QM2 ) ∪ {F M2 (a) : a ∈ A ∩ QM0 },
(b) B ∩ QM0 = (A ∩ QM0 ) ∪ {F M0 (b) : b ∈ A ∩ QM1 } ∪ {F M3 (c) : c ∈ A ∩ QM2 } and
(c) B ∩ QM1 = (A ∩ QM1 ) ∪ {F M1 (a, c) : a ∈ B ∩ QM0 & c ∈ B ∩ QM2 }.
In this case, B |= T0 and if M |= T +0 , then B |= T +0 .
To declutter the notation we shall from now on whenever possible in discussing T0, T +0
(and its model completion T ∗ which will be introduced later) omit the superscript M from
the function symbols.
Proof. (1) As M is a model we have that M = ∅, so at least one among QM0 , QM1 , QM2 is
not empty.
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If QM0 = ∅, then F2 guarantees that QM2 = ∅, so QM1 = ∅ because of F1. If
QM1 = ∅, then QM0 = ∅ because of F0. Finally, if QM2 = ∅, then QM0 = ∅ because of
F3, and we can again argue as above.
If a ∈ QM0 , let b ∈ QM2 be arbitrary. Then F1(a, b) ∈ QM1 and F0(F1(a, b)) = a.
Hence, F0 is onto. Also, F3(F2(a)) = a, so F M3 is onto.
(2) Let M |= T0 and QM0 , QM2 = ∅. For x ∈ QM0 and z ∈ QM2 such that (x, z) /∈
Dom(F M1 ), let F1(x, z) = y for any y ∈ QM1 such that F0(y) = x , which exists as F M0
is already onto. For x ∈ QM0 for which F2(x) is not already defined, let F2(x) = z for
any z such that F3(z) = x , which exists as F M3 is onto. Finally, extend F0 and F3 to be
total. The model described is a model of T +0 with the same universe as M .
(3) Let κ1 < κ2 < λ and let QM0 = κ2, QM1 = κ1>λ, while QM2 = κ1λ. For
α < κ2 let F2(α) be the function in κ1λ which is constantly α, and for ν ∈ κ1λ let
F3(ν) = min(Rang(ν)) if this value is < κ2, and 0 otherwise. Also, let F0(η) = lg(η)
and F1(α, ν) = ν  α be defined for ν ∈ κ1λ and α < κ1.
This is a model of T0, but not of T +0 because F1 is not total. If this model were to
be extended to a model of T +0 with the same universe, we would have that for every
ν ∈ κ1λ
F0(F1(κ1, ν)) = κ1 & F1(κ1, ν) = η
for some η ∈ κ1>λ. As F0(η) is already defined, F0(η) = lg(η) < κ1, which is a
contradiction.
(4) Given a model M of T0. First ensure that QM0 , QM1 , QM2 = ∅ by adding new elements
if necessary. Then make sure that F0 and F3 are total and onto, which might require
adding new elements to M (and hence redefining QM0 , QM1 , QM2 if needed). Now for
each x ∈ QM0 choose y(x) ∈ QM1 such that F0(y(x)) = x , which is possible since F0
is onto, and then define for every (x, z) ∈ QM0 × QM2 the value of F1(x, z) to be y(x),
unless F1(x, z) has already been defined to start with, in which case we leave it at that
value. Finally declare for x ∈ QM0 for which F2(x) has not already been defined that
F2(x) = z for any z such that F3(z) = x , which can be done since F3 is onto.
(5) We first prove the amalgamation property. Suppose that M0, M1 and M2 are models
of T +0 with |M1| ∩ |M2| = |M0|, and M0 ⊆ M1, M2. We define M3 as follows. Let
|M3| = |M1|⋃ |M2|, and for m ∈ {0, 2, 3} let F M3m (x) = F Mlm (x) if x ∈ Ml for
some l. This is well defined, because M1 and M2 agree on M0. Also, the identity
F3(F2(x)) = x is satisfied in M3. Now we let F M31 = F M11 ∪ F M21 . This does not
necessarily give us a total function, but we still have a model of T0 with universe
|M1| ∪ |M2| and so to obtain the desired amalgam (which has the same universe) we
apply part (2) of this claim. From this definition it follows that both M1 and M2 are
submodels of M3 and equal to its restriction to their respective universes.
To see that JEP holds, suppose that we are given two models M1, M2 of T +0 . Define
M by letting its universe be the disjoint union of M1 and M2, and define the functions
Fm for m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} by F Mm = F M1m ∪ F M2m . Then M is a model of T0, but like in the
proof of amalgamation, the function F1 might happen to be only partial, in which case
we extend M to a model of T +0 by applying part (2) of this claim. Then it can easily be
checked that M embeds both M1 and M2.
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(6) Suppose that A and M are as in the assumptions. Then items (a)–(c) of the statement
uniquely define a subset of M , which we shall call B . The proof will be complete if we
can prove that B is of the required size and is the closure of A.
Clearly B is contained in the closure of A and the size of B is as claimed. That is,
letting for l ∈ {0, 1, 2} the size of A ∩ QMl be nl and n = Σl<3nl , we have first that
|B ∩ QM2 | ≤ n2+n0, then |B ∩ QM0 | ≤ n0+n1+n2 ≤ n, and so |B ∩ QM1 | ≤ n1+n2.
It can be checked directly that B is closed, using the equations for T0, and it also easily
follows that B is a model of T0, or of T +0 if M is. 
Claim 1.5. T +0 has a complete model completion T ∗ which admits elimination of
quantifiers, and is ℵ0-categorical. In this theory the closure and the algebraic closure
coincide.
Proof. We can construct T ∗ directly. T ∗ admits elimination of quantifiers because T +0
has the amalgamation property and is universal ([2], 3.5.19). It can be seen from the
construction of T ∗ that it is complete, or alternatively, it can be seen that T ∗ has JEP
and so by [2], 3.5.11, it is complete. To see that the theory is ℵ0-categorical, observe that
Claim 1.4(6) implies that for every n there are only finitely many T0-types in n-variables.
Then by the Characterisation of Complete ℵ0-categorical Theories ([2], 2.3.13), T ∗ is ℵ0-
categorical. Using the elimination of quantifiers and the fact that all relational symbols
of the language of T ∗ have infinite domains in every model of T ∗, we can see that the
algebraic closure and the definable closure coincide in T ∗. 
Observation 1.6. If A, B ⊆ CT ∗ are closed and c ∈ cl(A ∪ B) \ A \ B , then c ∈ QCT ∗1 .
Proof. Notice that
cl(A ∪ B) =A ∪ B ∪ {F1(a, c) : a ∈ (A ∪ B) ∩ Q0 & c ∈ (A ∪ B) ∩ Q2
& {a, c}  A & {a, c}  B}
by Claim 1.4(6). 
Claim 1.7. T ∗ is NSOP3, consequently NSOP4.
Proof. Suppose that T ∗ is SOP3 and let ϕ(x¯, y¯), and 〈a¯n : n < ω〉 exemplify this in a
model M (see Definition 0.8(1)). Without loss of generality, by redefining ϕ if necessary,
each a¯n is without repetition and is closed (recall Claim 1.4(6)). By the Ramsey theorem
and compactness, we can assume that the given sequence is a part of an indiscernible
sequence 〈a¯k : k ∈ Z〉; hence a¯k’s form a ∆-system. Let for k ∈ Z
X<k
def=
⋂
m<k
cl(a¯mˆa¯k), X>k def=
⋂
m>k
cl(a¯mˆa¯k), Xk = cl(X<k ∪ X>k ).
Hence Rang(a¯k) ⊆ Xk , and Xk is closed. By Claim 1.4(6), there is an a priori finite bound
on the size of Xk ; hence by indiscernibility, we have that |Xk | = n∗ for some fixed n∗
not depending on k. Let a¯+k list Xk with no repetition. By Observation 1.6, Claim 1.4(6),
indiscernibility and the fact that each a¯k is closed, we have that for l ∈ {0, 2}
cl(a¯mˆa¯k) ∩ QCl = (Rang(a¯m) ∪ Rang(a¯k)) ∩ QCl
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and
Xk ∩ QC0 ⊆ Rang(a¯k) ∩ QC0 and Xk ∩ QC2 ⊆ Rang(a¯k) ∩ QC2 .
Applying the Ramsey theorem again, without loss of generality we have that 〈a¯+k : k ∈ Z〉
are indiscernible. Let
w∗0
def= {l : a¯+k1(l) = a¯+k2(l) for some (equivalently all) k1 = k2}.
If a¯+k1(l1) = a¯+k2(l2) for some k1 = k2, without loss of generality k1 < k2, by
indiscernibility and symmetry. By transitivity and the fact that each a¯+k is without
repetition, using k1 < k2 < k3 we get l1 = l2 ∈ w∗0 . Let w∗1 def= n∗ \ w∗0 , and
let a¯ = a¯+k  w∗0 and a¯′k = a¯+k  w∗1. Hence, 〈a¯ˆa¯′k : k ∈ Z〉 is an indiscernible
sequence, and Rang(a¯) ∩ Rang(a¯′k) = ∅ for all k. In addition, for k1 = k2 we have
Rang(a¯′k1) ∩ Rang(a¯′k2) = ∅ and Rang(a¯ˆa¯′k) = Xk .
Now we define a model N . Its universe is ∪0≤l<3{clM (a¯ˆa¯′lˆa¯′l+1)}, and QNi = QMi ∩N ,
F Nj = ∪{Fj,l : l < 3}, where Fj,l = F Mj  clM (a¯ˆa¯′l ˆa¯′l+1), or Fj,l = F Mj 
(clM (a¯ˆa¯′lˆa¯′l+1))2, as appropriate. Note that N is well defined, and that it is a model of
T0. N is not necessarily a model of T +0 , as the function F1 may be only partial. Notice
that Xl ⊆ N for l ∈ [0, 3]. We wish to define N ′ like N , but identifying a¯+0 and a¯+3
coordinatewise. We shall now check that this will give a well defined model of T0. Note
that by the proof of Observation 1.6 we have
N ′ =
⋃
0≤l<3
Xl ∪
⋃
0≤l<3
{F N1 (c, d) : c, d ∈ Xl ∪ Xl+1
& {c, d}  Xl & {c, d}  Xl+1 & F N1 (c, d) /∈ Xl ∪ Xl+1}.
The possible problem is that F N ′i might not be well defined, i.e. there could perhaps
be a case defined in two distinct ways. We verify that this does not happen, by discussing
various possibilities.
Case 1. For some b ∈ Rang(a¯+0 ), say b = a¯+0 (t), b′ = a¯+3 (t) and j ∈ {0, 2, 3}, we
have Fj (b) = Fj (b′) after the identification of a¯+0 with a¯+3 . As a¯+k ’s are closed, we have
Fj (b) = a¯+0 (s) and Fj (b′) = a¯+3 (s′) for some s, s′. By indiscernibility, we have s = s′,
hence the identification will make Fj (b) = Fj (b′).
Case 2. For some s, t we have that F1(a¯+0 (s), a¯
+
0 (t)) and F1(a¯
+
3 (s), a¯
+
3 (t)) are well
defined, but not the same after the identification of a¯+0 and a¯
+
3 . This case cannot happen,
as can be seen similarly to in Case 1.
Case 3. For some τ (x, y) ∈ {F1(x, y), F1(y, x)} and d1 = a¯+0 (s), d2 = a¯+3 (s) and
some e ∈ N we have that τ N (e, d1), τ N (e, d2) are well defined but do not get identified
when N ′ is defined.
By Case 2, we have that e /∈ a¯ and s /∈ w∗0. As τ (e, d1) is well defined and d1 ∈ X0 \ a¯,
necessarily e ∈ clM (X0 ∪ X1). Similarly, as τ (e, d2) is well defined and d2 ∈ X3 \ a¯, we
have e ∈ clM (X2 ∪ X3). But, as F1(e, dl) is well defined, we have e ∈ Q2 ∪ Q0. Hence
e ∈ clM (X0 ∪ X1) \ Q1 ⊆ X0 ∪ X1 and similarly e ∈ X2 ∪ X3. This implies e ∈ a¯, a
contradiction.
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As M is a model of T0, F M0 is onto (Claim 1.4(1)). Suppose y ∈ QN0 ; then for
some l ∈ [0, 3) we have that y ∈ clM (Xl ∪ Xl+1), so by Observation 1.6, we have
y ∈ Xl ∪ Xl+1. As each Xl is closed in M , by Claim 1.4(6) each Xl is a model of T +0 , so
y ∈ Rang(F M0  Xl); hence y ∈ Rang(F N0 ) and y ∈ Rang(F N
′
0 ). We can similarly prove
that F N ′3 is onto, and as each Xl is a model of T
+
0 we have by Claim 1.4(1) that QN
′
0 , QN
′
1
and QN ′2 are all non-empty. By Claim 1.4(2), N ′ can be extended to a model of T +0 .
By the choice of ϕ and the fact that T ∗ is complete we have that
T ∗ |= (∀x¯0, x¯1, x¯2)¬[ϕ(x¯0, x¯1) ∧ ϕ(x¯1, x¯2) ∧ ϕ(x¯2, x¯0)].
As T ∗ is the model completion of T +0 , in particular T ∗ and T
+
0 are cotheories, so we have
that
T +0 |= (∀x¯0, x¯1, x¯2)¬[ϕ(x¯0, x¯1) ∧ ϕ(x¯1, x¯2) ∧ ϕ(x¯2, x¯0)],
yet in N ′ we have
N ′ |= ϕ(a¯0, a¯1) ∧ ϕ(a¯1, a¯2) ∧ ϕ(a¯2, a¯0),
by the identification of a¯0 and a¯3. This is a contradiction. 
Definition 1.8. (1) A theory T is said to satisfy the oak property as exhibited by a formula
ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) iff for any infinite λ, κ there are b¯η(η ∈ κ>λ) and c¯ν(ν ∈ κλ) and a¯i (i < κ)
such that
(a) [η  ν & ν ∈ κλ] =⇒ ϕ[a¯lg(η), b¯η, c¯ν],
(b) If η ∈ κ>λ and ηˆ〈α〉  ν1 ∈ κλ and ηˆ〈β〉  ν2 ∈ κλ, while α = β and i > lg(η),
then ¬∃y¯ [ϕ(a¯i , y¯, c¯ν1) ∧ ϕ(a¯i , y¯, c¯ν2)],
and in addition ϕ satisfies
(c) ϕ(x¯, y¯1, z¯) ∧ ϕ(x¯, y¯2, z¯) =⇒ y¯1 = y¯2.
We allow for the replacement of CT by CeqT (i.e. allow y¯ to be a definable equivalence
class).
(2) We say that oak holds for T if this is true for some ϕ.
Observation 1.9. If some infinite λ, κ exemplify that oak(ϕ) holds, then so do all infinite
λ, κ . (This holds by the compactness theorem.)
Remark 1.10. We shall not need to use this, but let us remark that witnesses a¯, b¯, c¯ to
oak(ϕ) can be chosen to be indiscernible along an appropriate index set (a tree). This
can be proved using the technique of [10], Chapter VII, which employs the compactness
argument and an appropriate partition theorem.
Claim 1.11. T ∗ has oak.
Proof. Let
ϕ(x, y, z) def= Q0(x) ∧ Q1(y) ∧ Q2(z) ∧ F0(y) = x ∧ F1(x, z) = y.
Clearly, (c) of Definition 1.8(1) is satisfied. Given λ, κ , we shall define a model N = Nλ,κ
of T +0 . This will be a submodel of C = CT ∗ such that its universe consists of QN0 def=
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{ai : i < κ} with no repetitions, QN1 def= {bη : η ∈ κ>λ} with no repetitions and
QN2
def= {cν : ν ∈ κλ} with no repetitions, while Q0, Q1, Q2 are pairwise disjoint. We
also require that the following are satisfied in C = CT ∗ :
F0(bη) = alg(η), F1(ai , cν) = bνi
and that N is closed under F2 and F3. That such a choice is possible can be seen by writing
the corresponding type and using the saturativity of C.
We can check that N |= T +0 , and that N is a submodel of C when understood as a
model of T +0 . Clearly, (a) from Definition 1.8(1) is satisfied for ϕ and ai , bη, cν in place
of a¯i , b¯η, c¯ν respectively. To see (b), suppose that η, α, β, ν1, ν2 and i are as there, but d is
such that ϕ(ai , d, cν1) ∧ ϕ(ai , d, cν2). Hence F1(ai , cν1) = F1(ai , cν2), so ν1  i = ν2  i ,
a contradiction. This shows that ϕ is a witness for T ∗ having oak. 
A similar argument can be used to show that T ∗ is not simple, but in fact we shall prove
that no theory with the oak property is simple (this in particular answers a question of
A. Dolich raised in a private communication).
Claim 1.12. No theory with the oak property is simple.
Proof. Let T be a theory with the oak property and let κ, λ be cardinals such that κ > |T |,
2κ < λ and λ = λ<κ < λκ (such cardinals always exist). By Observation 1.9 we may
assume that the oak property of T is exemplified by a formula ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) and sequences
〈a¯i : i < κ〉, 〈b¯η : η ∈ κ>λ〉 and 〈c¯ν : ν ∈ κλ〉. For ν ∈ κλ let pν = pν(z¯) def=
{ϕ(a¯i , b¯νi , z¯) : i < κ}. Hence each pν is a type of cardinality κ and the set {pν : ν ∈ κλ}
consists of pairwise incompatible types. The set of parameters used in
⋃{pν : ν ∈ κλ} has
size ≤ κ · λ<κ = λ. By [10], III, 7.7, p. 141 this implies that T is not simple. 
We now pass to another example of a theory with oak that satisfies NSOP3, which is the
theory T ∗feq of infinitely many indexed independent equivalence relations. This example
also shows why it is that this research continues [14]. The readers uninterested in T ∗feq can
skip to the next section without loss of continuity. We use the notation for T ∗feq which was
used in [4], while the fact that this is equivalent to the notation in [14] was explained in [4].
The existence of the required model completion is explained in [4].
Definition 1.13. (1) T +feq is the following theory in {Q, P, E, R, F}:
(a) Predicates P and Q are unary and disjoint, and (∀x) [P(x) ∨ Q(x)].
(b) E is an equivalence relation on Q.
(c) R is a binary relation on Q × P such that
[x R z & y R z & x E y] =⇒ x = y.
(Explanation: so R picks for each z ∈ Q (at most) one representative of any E-equivalence class.)
(d) F is a (total) binary function from Q × P to Q, which satisfies
F(x, z) ∈ Q & (F(x, z) R z) & (x E F(x, z)) .
(Explanation: so for x ∈ Q and z ∈ P , the function F picks the representative of the E-equivalence class of x which
is in the relation R with z.)
(2) T ∗feq is the model completion of T +feq.
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Remark 1.14. After renaming, CeqT ∗feq is a reduct of C
eq
T ∗ ; formally T
∗
feq is interpretable in
T ∗. Given a model M of T ∗, we define N = N1[M] by letting its universe be QM1
⋃ QM2
and P N = QM2 , while QN = QM1 . We let
y Ez iff F M0 (y) = F M0 (z) and F N (x, z) = F1(F0(x), z).
We also let x R z ⇐⇒ F N (x, z) = x . It is easily seen that N |= T +feq, and moreover,
N |= T ∗feq.
Using the above Remark and the fact that oak and NSOP3 are preserved up to
isomorphism of Ceq, we obtain:
Corollary 1.15. (1) T ∗feq has oak.
(2) T ∗feq has NSOP3.1
Proof. (1) Use the formula ϕ(x, y, z) ≡ F(x, z) = y.
(2) Follows by Remark 1.14. 
Part (2) of Corollary 1.15 was stated without proof in [16]. The results here suggest the
following questions.
Question 1.16. (1) Does T ∗ satisfy SOP2 or SOP1?
(2) Are there any nontrivial examples of oak theories that have SOP3?
Properties SOP2 or SOP1 were introduced in [4] where it was shown that SOP3 =⇒
SO P2 =⇒ SO P2 =⇒ not simple, but it was left open to decide whether any of these
implications is reversible. These properties are studied further in [21] where it is proved
that T ∗feq has NSOP1. This makes it reasonable to conjecture that the answer to both parts
of 1.16 is positive.
We finish the section by quoting a result of Shelah from [14], which can be compared
with our non-universality results from Section 2. The notation is explained in Section 2.
Theorem 1.17 (Shelah). Suppose that κ,µ and λ are cardinals satisfying
(1) κ = cf(µ) < µ, λ = cf(λ),
(2) µ+ < λ,
(3) there is a family
{(ai , bi ) : i < i∗, ai ∈ [λ]<µ, bi ∈ [λ]κ}
such that |{bi : i < i∗}| ≤ λ and satisfying that for every f : λ → λ there is i such
that f (bi ) ⊆ ai ; and
(4) ppΓ (κ)(µ) > λ + |i∗|.
Then univ(T +feq, λ) ≥ ppΓ (κ)(µ).
1 It has subsequently been proved by Shelah and Usvyatsov in [21] that T ∗feq has a stronger property NSOP1.
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2. Non-universality results
In this section we present two general theorems showing that under certain cardinal
arithmetic assumptions oak theories do not admit universal models. Let us start by
introducing some common abbreviations that we shall use in the statements and the proofs
in this section.
Notation 2.1. (1) Let κ ≤ λ be cardinals. We let
[λ]κ def= {A ⊆ λ : |A| = κ}.
If κ is regular we let
Sλκ
def= {α < λ : cf(α) = κ}.
(2) For a set A of ordinals we let the set of accumulation points of A be acc(A) def= {α ∈
A : α = sup(A ∩ α)} and the set of non-accumulation points be nacc(A) def= A \ acc(A).
Before proceeding to the non-universality theorems recall from the Introduction the def-
inition of a tight club guessing sequence (Definition 0.2). Note that the definition does not
require sets Cδ to be either closed or unbounded in δ. It can be deduced from the existing
literature on club guessing sequences that tight and truly tight club guessing sequences
exist for many triples (κ, µ, λ). We shall indicate in Claim 2.10 how this deduction can be
made, but let us leave this for the discussion on the consistency of the assumptions of the
non-universality theorems, which will be given after their proofs. We shall now give two
non-universality theorems. These theorems have set-theoretic and model-theoretic assump-
tions. The model-theoretic assumption is the same in both cases: that we are dealing with
an oak theory of size < λ, with the desired conclusion being that the universality number
univ(T, λ) is larger than λ. The set-theoretic assumptions, which are different for the two
theorems, will be phrased in the form of certain combinatorial statements that are needed
for the proofs of the theorem. As with tight club guessing sequences, it might not be imme-
diately clear to the reader that these assumptions are consistent. However, after we prove
the theorems we shall give some sufficient conditions for these assumptions to be satisfied
and as a corollary get some non-universality results whose set-theoretic assumptions are
phrased in the form of cardinal arithmetic and known to be consistent.
Theorems 2.2 and 2.4 have similar proofs, as we explain below, so we shall first state
both theorems and then give the proofs simultaneously.
Theorem 2.2. Assume that κ,µ, σ and λ are cardinals satisfying
(1) cf(κ) = κ < µ < λ = cf(λ) and there is a tight (µ, λ) club guessing sequence,
(2) λ < µκ ,
(3) κ ≤ σ ≤ λ,
(4) there are families P1 ⊆ [λ]κ and P2 ⊆ [σ ]κ such that
(i) for every injective g : σ → λ there is X ∈ P2 with {g(i) : i ∈ X} ∈ P1,
(ii) |P1| < µκ, |P2| ≤ λ,
(5) T is a theory of size < λ which has the oak property.
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Then
univ(T, λ) ≥ µκ.
Definition 2.3. For cardinals κ ≤ µ we define
UJ bdκ (µ)
def= min{|P | : P ⊆ [µ]κ & (∀b ∈ [µ]κ)(∃a ∈ P)(|a ∩ b| = κ}.
More on UJ bdκ (µ) can be found in [19].
Theorem 2.4. Assume that κ,µ, σ and λ are cardinals satisfying
(1) cf(κ) = κ < µ < λ = cf(λ) and there is a tight (µ, λ) club guessing sequence,
(2) λ < UJ bdκ (µ),(3) κ ≤ σ ≤ λ,
(4) there are families P1 ⊆ [λ]κ and P2 ⊆ [σ ]κ such that
(i) for every injective g : σ → λ there is X ∈ P2 such that for some Y ∈ P1
|{g(i) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y | = κ,
(ii) |P1| < UJ bdκ (µ), |P2| ≤ λ,(5) T has the oak property.
Then
univ(T, λ) ≥ UJ bdκ (µ).
Before we start the proof let us give an introduction to the methods that appear within
it. When proving that the universality number of a certain category with given morphisms
(so not just in the context of first order model theory) is high it is often the case that
one can associate with each object in the category a certain construct, an invariant, which
is to some extent preserved by morphisms. For example such an invariant might be an
ordinal number and then one can prove that such an invariant may only increase after
an embedding. The proof then proceeds by contradiction by showing that any candidate
for the universal would have to satisfy too many invariants. A trivial example would be
to show that there is no countable well-ordering that is universal under order preserving
embeddings: the order type of the ordering is an invariant that satisfies that if f : P → Q
is an order preserving embedding, then the order type of Q is at least as large as that of P .
Any Q that would be universal would have to have a countable well-order type that is larger
than that of all countable ordinals, a contradiction. As trivial as it is, this example points out
two stages of a non-universality proof: construction which associates an object with every
invariant prescribed by a certain set (e.g. the uncountable set of all countable ordinals) and
preservation that shows that some essential features of the invariant are preserved (e.g.
the order type does not decrease) under embeddings. In our proofs we shall use the same
method, except that the invariants will be defined as certain λ-sequences of subsets of µ,
unique modulo the club filter on λ, and that the preservation and the resulting contradiction
will be dependent on a certain club guessing sequence. Using such invariants is a technique
that was first used by Kojman and Shelah in [8] and has appeared in a number of papers
since. The main point tends to be the right definition of an invariant and the use of a right
kind of club guessing.
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Proof. We shall use the same proof for both Theorems 2.2 and 2.4. The two main Lemmas
are the same for the two theorems, and we shall indicate the differences which occur toward
the end of the proof. Suppose that ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) shows that T has the oak property and let
ai (i < κ), bη (η ∈ κ>λ) and cν(ν ∈ κλ) exemplify the oak property of ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) for λ
and κ . For notational simplicity, let us assume that lg(x¯) = lg(y¯) = lg(z¯) = 1.
Let 〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉 be a tight (µ, λ) club guessing sequence. For each δ, let 〈α(δ, ζ ) :
ζ < µ〉 be the increasing enumeration of Cδ . Let C+ be a (saturated enough) expansion of
CT by the Skolem functions for CT .
Definition 2.5. (1) For N¯ = 〈Nγ : γ < λ〉 an ≺-increasing continuous sequence of
models of T of size < λ, and for a, c ∈ Nλ def= ⋃γ<λ Nγ , and δ ∈ S, we let
invN¯ (c, Cδ, a)
def= {ζ < µ : (∃b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ+1) \ Nα(δ,ζ ))(Nλ |= ϕ[a, b, c])}.
(2) For a set A and δ, N¯ as above, let
invAN¯ (c, Cδ)
def=
⋃
{invN¯ (c, Cδ, a) : a ∈ A}.
Note 2.6. Following the notation of Definition 2.5, notice that invN¯ (c, Cδ, a) is always a
singleton or empty, since if there is b ∈ Nλ such that ϕ[a, b, c] holds then such b is unique
(by part (c) of Definition 1.8). Consequently invAN¯ (c, Cδ) ∈ [µ]≤|A|.
Construction Lemma 2.7. For every A∗ ∈ [µ]κ of order type κ , there is an ≺-increasing
continuous sequence N¯ A∗ = 〈N A∗γ : γ < λ〉 of models of T of size < λ and a set
{aˆi : i < σ } of elements of NA∗ def= ⋃γ<λ N A∗γ such that for some club E∗ of λ, for every
X ∈ P2, for some αX < λ, for every δ ∈ S satisfying min(Cδ) > αX , there is c ∈ NA∗
such that inv{aˆi : i∈X}N¯A∗ (c, Cδ) = A
∗
.
In addition, the universe of NA∗ is λ.
Proof of the Lemma. Let P2 = {Xα : α < α∗ ≤ λ}. Without loss of generality
σ ⊆⋃α<α∗ Xα .
Given A∗. Let f = fA∗ be an increasing function from the successor ordinals < κ
into µ such that Rang( f ) = A∗. For δ ∈ S let νδ be the function from κ into λ such that
νδ(ζ ) = α(δ, f (ζ )) for all ζ < κ . Note that νδ is increasing. Hence cνδ is well defined, as
is bη for η  νδ . For X ∈ P2, let ρX be a bijection between the ordinals < κ that have the
form β + 2 for some β and X . For η ∈ κ>λ let us say that η is good iff the domain of η is
of the form β + 2 for some β < κ .
By a compactness argument, we can see that there are 〈aˆi : i < σ 〉 and for X ∈ P2,
sequences 〈cXνδ : δ ∈ S〉, 〈bXη : η  νδ & η good & δ ∈ S〉 such that for η good and δ ∈ S
η  νδ =⇒ |= ϕ[aˆρX (lg(η)), bXη , cXνδ ]
and the appropriate translation of (b) from Definition 1.8 holds. By taking an isomorphic
copy of C+ if necessary, we can assume that the Skolem hull in C+ of
{aˆi : i < σ } ∪ {bXη : X ∈ P2 & (∃δ ∈ S)η  νδ} ∪ {cXνδ : X ∈ P2 & δ ∈ S}
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is contained in λ. Let for γ < λ the model N A∗γ be the reduction to L(T ) of the Skolem
hull in C+ of
γ ∪ {aˆi : i ∈ ∪α<min{α∗,γ }Xα} ∪
∪
⋃
α<min{α∗,γ }
{cXανδ : δ ∈ S ∩ γ & sup(Rang(νδ)) < γ } ∪
∪
⋃
α<min{α∗,γ }
{bXαη : η  νδ for some δ ∈ S & η good & sup(Rang(η)) < γ }.
Hence N¯ A∗ = 〈N A∗γ : γ < λ〉 is ≺-increasing continuous, and it also follows that the
universe of N A∗ def= ⋃γ<λ N A∗γ is λ. We observe also that for γ < λ we have |N A∗γ | < λ
because λ is regular, T has size < λ and the Skolem hull needed to obtain N A∗γ is taken
over a set of size < λ. That this set has size < λ might not be immediate, since in the last
clause of its definition we allow δ to range over the entire set S, whose size is λ. However,
for every η appearing in this part of the definition, η is increasing (as an initial segment of
some νδ) and it satisfies sup(Rang(η)) < γ . Since the domain of η is of the form β + 2
for some β, this means η(β + 1) < γ . For any δ ∈ S such that η  νδ we have that
η(β + 1) ∈ Cδ , so either η(β + 1) ∈ nacc(Cδ) or for some γ ′ ∈ nacc(Cδ) we have that
η(β) < γ ′ < η(β + 1). At any rate, Rang(η) is a subset of size < κ of a set of the form
Cδ ∩ ξ ∪ {o} for some ξ ∈ nacc(Cδ) and ξ, o are both < γ . As part of the choice of C¯ we
obtain that for any ξ < γ
|{Cδ ∩ ξ : δ ∈ S, ξ ∈ nacc(Cδ)}| < λ.
For δ ∈ S and ξ ∈ nacc(Cδ) let ζ ∗(δ, ξ) def= min{ζ : α(δ, f (ζ )) ≥ ξ}, if this is well
defined, and let ζ ∗(δ, ξ) = κ otherwise. Now notice that if Cδ ∩ ξ = Cδ′ ∩ ξ then we have
ζ ∗(δ, ξ) = ζ ∗(δ′, ξ) and that νδ  ζ ∗(δ, ξ) = νδ′  ζ ∗(δ′, ξ). Our analysis shows that any η
relevant to the third clause of the definition of N A∗γ and having domain β + 2 satisfies that
η  (β + 1) = (νδ  ζ ∗(δ, ξ))  (β + 1) for some δ ∈ S and ξ < γ and hence that there are
< λ choices for bXαη . Let E∗ be a club of λ such that for every δ ∈ E∗ and good η we have
bXβη ∈ N A∗δ iff β < δ & (∃δ′ ∈ S ∩ δ)[η  νδ′ ].
Given α < α∗, X = Xα and δ ∈ S with min(Cδ) ≥ α + 1 and Cδ ⊆ E∗, we shall show
that with
I def= inv{aˆi : i∈X}N¯ A∗ (cXνδ , Cδ)
we have I = A∗. Notice that ε < κ =⇒ α(δ, f (ε)) > α trivially since min(Cδ) > α.
Let i ∈ X , β + 2 = ρ−1X (i) and let η = 〈α(δ, f (ε)) : ε ≤ β + 1〉. We have that η  νδ
and i = ρX (lg(η)). Hence ϕ[aˆi , bXη , cXνδ ] holds. Let ζ = f (β + 1). We then have that
bXη ∈ N A∗α(δ,ζ )+1 ⊆ N A
∗
α(δ,ζ+1) (as α(δ, ζ ) + 1 is strictly larger than sup(Rang(η)) = α(δ, ζ )
and α < α(δ, ζ ) + 1), but bXη /∈ N A∗α(δ,ζ ) by the choice of E∗. Hence ζ = f (β + 1) ∈ I . So
A∗ ⊆ I because every element of A∗ is f (β + 1) for some β as above.
In the other direction, suppose ζ ∈ I and let i ∈ X be such that ζ is in
invN¯ A∗ (cXνδ , Cδ, aˆi ). Hence for some b ∈ N A
∗
α(δ,ζ+1) \ N A
∗
α(δ,ζ ) we have |= ϕ[aˆi , b, cXνδ ].
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Constructing η as in the previous paragraph we have that |= ϕ[aˆi , bXη , cXνδ ] holds. Using the
uniqueness property from (c) of Definition 1.8 we see that b = bXη so ζ = f (β + 1) for
some β. So A∗ = I . 
Note 2.8. With the notation of Lemma 2.7, for any i ∈ ⋃α<min{α∗,δ} Xα we have
invN¯ A∗ (cXδ , Cδ, aˆi ) = ∅, as follows from the forward direction of the proof that A∗ = I .
Preservation Lemma 2.9. Suppose that N and N∗ are models of T both with universe λ,
and f : N → N∗ is an elementary embedding, while 〈Nγ : γ < λ〉 and 〈N∗γ : γ < λ〉 are
continuous increasing sequences of models of T of cardinality < λ with ⋃γ<λ Nγ = N
and
⋃
γ<λ N∗γ = N∗. Further suppose that {aˆα : α < κ} ⊆ N is given. Let
E def=
{
γ : (N, N
∗, f )  γ ≺ (N, N∗, f ) & sup({aα : α < κ}) < γ &
the universes of Nγ and N∗γ are both the set γ
}
.
Then for every c ∈ N and δ with Cδ ⊆ E, and for every α < κ we have
invN¯ (c, Cδ, aˆα) = invN¯∗ ( f (c), Cδ, f (aˆα)).
Proof of the Lemma. Note that E is a club of λ. Fix c ∈ N and δ ∈ S as required, and let
a = aα for some α < κ . We shall see that invN¯ (c, Cδ, a) = invN¯∗( f (c), Cδ, f (a)).
Suppose ζ < µ is an element of invN¯ (c, Cδ, a), so there is b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ+1) with
N |= ϕ[a, b, c], while there is no such b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ ) (we are using the uniqueness property
from (c) of Definition 1.8). We have that N∗ satisfies ϕ[ f (a), f (b), f (c)]. As Cδ ⊆ E we
have that α(δ, ζ + 1) ∈ E , and as b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ+1), clearly f (b) ∈ N∗α(δ,ζ+1). Similarly, by
the definition of E again and the fact that f is injective we have f (b) /∈ N∗α(δ,ζ ). By the
assumptions on ϕ we have
N∗ |= “(∀y)[ϕ( f (a), y, f (c)) =⇒ y = f (b)]”,
so ζ ∈ invN¯∗ ( f (c), Cδ, f (a)).
In the other direction, suppose ζ < µ is an element of invN¯∗ ( f (c), Cδ, f (a)), so there
is b∗ ∈ N∗α(δ,ζ+1) with N∗ |= ϕ[ f (a), b∗, f (c)], while there is no such b∗ ∈ N∗α(δ,ζ ).
Hence N∗ |= ∃y (ϕ[ f (a), y, f (c)]), so N |= ∃y (ϕ[a, y, c]). Let b ∈ N be such that
N |= ϕ[a, b, c]. Hence N∗ |= ϕ[ f (a), f (b), f (c)]. Again by (c) of Definition 1.8, we
have f (b) = b∗, so b ∈ Nα(δ,ζ+1) \ Nα(δ,ζ ) because {α(δ, ζ ), α(δ, ζ + 1)} ⊆ E , so by the
choice of E we have that for γ ∈ {α(δ, ζ ), α(δ, ζ + 1)}, (N, N∗, f )  γ is an elementary
submodel of (N, N∗, f ). As this b is unique (by (c) of Definition 1.8) we have that ζ
belongs to invN¯ (c, Cδ, a). 
Proof of the Theorems continued (Theorem 2.2 (Theorem 2.4)). To conclude the proof
of the theorems, given θ < µκ [θ < UJ bdκ (µ)], we shall see that univ(T, λ) > θ .
Without loss of generality, we can assume that θ ≥ λ + |P1|. Given 〈N∗j : j < θ〉 a
sequence of models of T each of size λ, we shall show that these models are not jointly
universal. So suppose they were. Without loss of generality, the universe of each N∗j is λ.
Let N¯∗j = 〈N∗γ, j : γ < λ〉 be an increasing continuous sequence of models of T of size
< λ such that N∗j =
⋃
γ<λ N∗γ, j , for j < θ . For each A ∈ P1 (so A ∈ [λ]κ ), δ ∈ S,
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j < θ and d ∈ N∗j , we compute invAN¯∗j (d, Cδ), each time obtaining an element of [µ]
≤κ
.
The number of elements of [µ]≤κ obtained in this way is
≤ |P1| · |S| · θ · λ ≤ θ.
By the choice of θ [and the definition of UJ bdκ (µ)], we can choose A∗ ∈ [µ]κ such that A∗
is not equal to any of these sets [is almost disjoint (i.e. has intersection of size < κ) to any
one of these sets]. Let N def= NA∗ be as guaranteed to exist by the Construction Lemma,
and let {aˆi : i < σ }, N¯ A∗ def= 〈N A∗γ : γ < λ〉 and E∗ be as in that Lemma. In particular,
the universe of N is λ. Suppose that j < θ and f : N → N∗j is an elementary embedding,
and let
E∗∗ def=
{
δ ∈ E∗ : (N, N∗j , f )  δ ≺ (N, N∗j , f ) &
the universe of each N∗δ, j , N A
∗
δ is δ
}
.
Let g : σ → λ be given by g(i) = f (aˆi ). Note that g is injective because f is an
isomorphic embedding. By assumption (4)(i) of Theorem 2.2 [2.4], there is X = Xα ∈ P2
such that { f (aˆi ) : i ∈ X} ∈ P1 [for some Y ∈ P1 we have
|{ f (aˆi ) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y | = κ].
Let αX < λ be as provided by the Construction Lemma, and let
E def= (E∗∗ \ αX ) ∩ {δ : {aˆi : i ∈ X} ⊆ δ}.
Since we have that the universe of N is λ we have {aˆi : i < σ } ⊆ λ, so as X is a set of
size κ < λ we can conclude that E is a club of λ. We now choose δ ∈ S such that Cδ ⊆ E ,
so in particular Cδ ⊆ E∗ and min(Cδ) > αX .
The Construction Lemma guarantees that there is c ∈ N such that inv{aˆi : i∈X}N¯ (c, Cδ) =
A∗. By the Preservation Lemma we have
inv{ f (aˆi ): i∈X}N¯∗j
( f (c), Cδ) = A∗
[inv{ f (aˆi ): i∈X}N¯∗j ( f (c), Cδ) ∩ A
∗ includes inv{ f (aˆi ): i∈X}∩YN¯∗j
( f (c), Cδ)].
In the case of Theorem 2.2 we have a contradiction with the choice of A∗ and we are
done. We are almost done also in the case of Theorem 2.4, but we need to know that
inv{ f (aˆi ): i∈X}∩YN¯∗j
( f (c), Cδ) has size κ . We know that { f (aˆi) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y has size κ ,
but it is a priori possible that for some i ∈ X we have invN¯∗j ( f (c), Cδ, f (aˆi )) = ∅.
However, by Note 2.8 and the choice of E we have that invN¯ (c, Cδ, aˆi ) = ∅ for all i ,
and then by the Preservation Lemma invN¯∗j ( f (c), Cδ, f (aˆi )) = ∅. This finishes the proof
of Theorem 2.4.  
Let us now pass to the promised discussion of the consistency of our assumptions. The
following is a claim about the existence of tight club guessing sequences. If we were to
concentrate on truly tight club guessing sequences then we could quote further results,
for example a theorem of Shelah from [13], so in this sense Claim 2.10 is not optimal.
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However for what we need in the main theorems tight club guessing sequences suffice;
hence the claim is formulated in a form that is not optimal but is sufficient, with a gain of
simplicity in presentation.
Claim 2.10. Suppose that κ < λ are regular.
(1) If κ+ < λ then there is a truly tight (κ, κ, λ) club guessing sequence.
(2) If κ = cf(µ) ≤ µ and µ+ < λ then there is a tight (µ, λ) guessing sequence.
Proof. (1) This is proved in [19], 1.3(a). An alternative proof is to deduce the statement
from Claim 1.6. of [13] (for uncountable κ) by letting Pδ = {Cδ} for δ ∈ S.
(2) If µ++ < λ we simply find a truly tight (µ+, µ+, λ) sequence 〈Eδ : δ ∈ S〉, which
exists by (1), and then let Cδ be the first µ elements of Eδ . If λ = µ++, the statement is
proved in [19], 1.3(b). Alternatively, this follows from the partial square for successors of
regulars proved in [12], Section 4. 
Remark 2.11. A problematic but natural case for (2) in Claim 2.10 would be when
κ = cf(µ) < µ and λ = µ+. The conclusion still “usually” holds (i.e. it holds in most
natural models of set theory).
Let us now comment on the assumptions (3) and (4) used in Theorems 2.2 and 2.4.
An impatient reader might have accused us at this point of unnecessary generalisation
and introduction of too many cardinals into the theorem, only to obscure the real issues.
Why not set κ = µ = σ? The reason is that in this case (2) would prevent us from
fulfilling (4). For example, suppose that κ<κ = κ and we are considering the requirements
of Theorem 2.2. We can let P of size θ def= κκ be a family of almost disjoint elements of
[κ]κ . Let 〈g j : j < θ〉 be some sequence enumerating all increasing enumerations of the
elements of P . Hence for j = j ′ the set {γ : g j (γ ) = g j ′(γ )} has size < κ . Suppose
that P1 and P2 exemplify that (3) and (4) hold with σ = κ , and assume also that (1)
and (2) hold with µ = κ . Let P2 = {Xα : α < α∗ ≤ λ}. For every j < θ there is
α( j) < α∗ such that {g j (i) : i ∈ Xα( j )} ∈ P1. Since |P1|, λ < θ , there is A ∈ P1 such
that BA
def= { j < θ : {g j (i) : i ∈ Xα( j )} = A} has size at least λ+. Since |P2| ≤ λ, there
is β such that
|{ j : α( j) = β & {g j (i) : i ∈ Xα( j )} = A}| ≥ λ+.
This is a contradiction to the fact that the elements of P are almost disjoint.
In fact the situation that is natural for us to consider is when µ is a strong limit singular,
because of the following Claim, which follows from the “generalised GCH” theorem of
Shelah proved in [15] (Theorem 0.1).
Claim 2.12. Suppose that θ is a strong limit singular cardinal (for example θ = ω) and
that κ = cf(κ) and λ satisfy θ ∈ (κ, λ]. Then for every large enough regular σ ∈ (κ, θ),
there are P1, P2 satisfying parts (4) of the assumptions of Theorem 2.2 and |P1|, |P2| ≤ λ.
Proof. By Theorem 0.1 of [15] for every large enough regular σ ∈ (κ, θ) there is a family
P = P(σ ) of elements of [λ]σ whose size is λ and such that any element of [λ]σ can be
covered by the union of < σ members of P (in the notation of [15], λ[σ ] = λ). Let us
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fix such a σ and let P = P(σ ). Let P2 = [σ ]κ , so since θ is a strong limit we have
|P2| < θ ≤ λ. Let P1 be the family of all subsets of size κ of the elements of P , so
|P1| ≤ λ · σκ ≤ λ.
Suppose now that g : σ → λ is injective; hence the range of g is an element of [λ]σ . By
the choice of P and the regularity of σ there is Z ∈ P such that Rang(g) ∩ Z has size σ .
Let Y be any subset of Z of size κ , so Y ∈ P1. Letting X be such that {g(i) : i ∈ X} = Y
we have that X ∈ P2 since g is injective. 
Putting together Claims 2.10 and 2.12 we can see that our non-universality results apply
in a large number of set-theoretic situations that are known to be consistent, and moreover
follow just from the assumptions on the cardinal arithmetic:
Corollary 2.13. Suppose that θ is a strong limit singular cardinal and that κ,µ and λ
satisfy
(1) cf(µ) = κ < θ ≤ µ < µ+ < λ = cf(λ),
(2) λ < µκ .
Then for any theory T of size < λ satisfying the oak property, we have univ(T, λ) ≥ µκ .
Proof. The assumptions in (1) specifically say that λ > µ+. By Claim 2.10, assumption
(1) of Theorem 2.2 is satisfied. By Claim 2.12, assumption (4) of Theorem 2.2 is satisfied
for all large enough regular σ ∈ (κ, θ). The conclusion follows by Theorem 2.2. 
We shall now show that a conclusion similar to the one obtained in Corollary 2.13 can
be obtained from an assumption whose negation is not known to be consistent (i.e. for all
we know this assumption is true just in Z FC).
Claim 2.14. Suppose that κ and λ are regular and λ ≥ κ+ω+1. Further suppose that
for some n, cov(λ, κ+n+1, κ+n+1, κ+n) = λ. (∗λ,κ )
Then for any n showing that (∗λ,κ ) holds, letting σ = κ+n we have that clause (4) of the
assumptions of Theorem 2.4 holds with some P1,P2 satisfying |P1|, |P2| ≤ λ.
Here we use the familiar pcf notation:
Notation 2.15. For cardinals λ ≥ µ ≥ θ ≥ σ we let cov(λ, µ, θ, σ ) be the smallest
possible size of a familyP of elements of [λ]<µ such that every element of [λ]<θ is covered
by the union of < σ elements of P .
Proof. By the choice of n there is P0 ⊆ [λ]κ+n with |P0| ≤ λ and such that for every
A ∈ [λ]κ+n there are α < κ+n and Ai ∈ P0 for i < α such that A ⊆ ∪i<α Ai . As κ is
regular, cf([κ+n]κ ,⊆) ≤ κ+n+1. Let P2 ⊆ [σ ]κ exemplify this. For A ∈ P0 let h A be a
one-to-one function from σ onto A, and let P1 = {h A“B : A ∈ P0, B ∈ P2}. We have
that |P1|, |P2| ≤ λ and that P1 ⊆ [λ]κ .
As for the clause (i) of (4), let an injective g : σ → λ be given. By the choice of P1,
there are α < σ and Ai ∈ P0 for i < α such that Rang(g) ⊆ ∪i<α Ai . Hence for some
i < α we have |Rang(g) ∩ Ai | = σ . Let B = {ζ < σ : h Ai (ζ ) ∈ Rang(g)}, so B ∈ [σ ]σ .
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Hence for some B ′ ∈ P2 we have |B ∩ B ′| = κ . Let Y = h Ai “B ′, so Y ∈ P1. Now choose
X ∈ P2 that includes {ε < σ : g(ε) ∈ Y }, so clearly |{g(i) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y | = κ . 
Remark 2.16. In the notation of Claim 2.14, the failure of (∗λ,κ) is not known to be
consistent for any λ, κ as above. For example, consider the hypothesis (F) of [13],
Section 6, which states:
for every λ the set of singular cardinals χ < λ whose cofinality is uncountable and that
satisfy ppΓ (cf(χ))(χ) ≥ λ is finite,
and the consistency of whose negation is not known. By the “cov versus pp” theorem
of [11], II 5.4, we have that for every n ≥ 1,
cov(λ, κ+n+1, κ+n+1, κ+n) = sup{ppΓ (κ+n)(χ) : χ ∈ [κ+n+1, λ], cf(χ) = κ+n},
so Hypothesis (F) implies (∗λ,κ ). One can see from the proof of Claim 2.14 that for our
purposes even weaker statements suffice.
Corollary 2.17. Suppose that
(1) cf(µ) = κ < µ < µ+ < λ,
(2) (∗λ,κ ), and
(3) λ < UJ bdκ (µ).
Then for every theory T of size < λ satisfying the oak property we have univ(T, λ) ≥
UJ bdκ (µ).
Proof. The conclusion follows by Claim 2.10, 2.14 and Theorem 2.4. 
Let us also comment on the connection between the assumptions of Theorems 2.2 and
2.4. If ℵ0 < κ = cf(µ) < µ and for all θ < µ we have θκ < µ, then
ppJ bdκ (µ) = µκ = UJ bdκ (µ)
(by [11], Chapter VII, Section 1).
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